This work investigates the vulnerability of Gaussian Mixture Model (GMM) i-vector based speaker verification (SV) systems to adversarial attacks, and the transferability of adversarial samples crafted from GMM i-vector based systems to x-vector based systems. In detail, we formulate the GMM i-vector based system as a scoring function, and leverage the fast gradient sign method (FGSM) to generate adversarial samples through this function. These adversarial samples are used to attack both GMM i-vector and x-vector based systems. We measure the vulnerability of the systems by the degradation of equal error rate and false acceptance rate. Experimental results show that GMM i-vector based systems are seriously vulnerable to adversarial attacks, and the generated adversarial samples are proved to be transferable and pose threats to neural network speaker embedding based systems (e.g. x-vector systems).
INTRODUCTION
Automatic speaker verification (ASV) systems aim at confirming a spoken utterance against a speaker identity claim. Through decades of years' development, speaker verification community has made great progress and applied this technology in many biometric authentication cases, such as voice activation in phones, bank authentication online, etc.
However, past research has shown that ASV systems are vulnerable to malicious attacks via spoofing and fake speech, such as imitated [1, 2] , replayed [2, 3] , synthetic [4, 5] and converted [6] speech. These spoofing and fake speech are created to sound like the voice of the target person as much as possible. Moreover, ASV systems can also be spoofed even though the spoofing speech sounds like the voice of the nontarget person from human perception. It will expose the systems to some other dangerous situations, such as controlling one's voice-operated devices in place of the real owner un-beknownst to him/her. These situations can be achieved by adversarial attacks.
According to [7] [8] [9] , deep neural networks (DNNs) with impressive performance can be vulnerable to simple adversarial attacks in many tasks, such as face recognition [10, 11] , image classification [12, 13] , and speech recognition [14] . However, to the best of our knowledge, the only work that applied adversarial attack into ASV systems is [15] where they verified the vulnerability of an end-to-end ASV system to adversarial attacks. Briefly, there are three representative ASV frameworks: i-vector speaker embedding based systems [16] [17] [18] [19] , neural network (NN) speaker embedding based systems [20, 21] and end-to-end approaches [22] [23] [24] . While end-toend based systems have proved to be vulnerable to adversarial attacks, the robustness of other approaches, including GMM i-vector based systems and NN speaker embedding based systems (e.g. x-vector systems we implement), still remains to be explored. Importantly, GMM i-vector based systems are widely applied to biometric authentication, and it is imperative to investigate their robustness to such adversarial attacks.
Adversarial attacks have two main scenarios: white box attack and black box attack. White box attack allows the attacker to access the complete parameters of the system, and adversarial samples can be constructed by an optimization on the input while fixing the system parameters. Black box attacker only has the access to the system's input and output, and adversarial samples are crafted by other substitute systems. To generate an adversarial sample, a designed subtle perturbation is added to the input so that the system outputs a wrong prediction while there is nearly no difference from human perception between spoofing and original input.
This work focuses on the robustness of GMM i-vector systems under adversarial attacks, and the adversarial samples' transferability to x-vector systems. One of the simplest attack methods, i.e. fast gradient sign method (FGSM) [9] , is adopted to generate adversarial samples from GMM i-vector systems. These samples are used to perform white and black box attacks on GMM i-vector systems, and black box attack on x-vector systems. Our codes will be made open-source 1 .
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 and 3 introduce the ASV systems and FGSM adopted in our experiments, respectively. Experiment setup and results are illustrated in Section 4 and 5. Section 6 concludes this work.
AUTOMATIC SPEAKER VERIFICATION SYSTEMS
In this work, GMM i-vector and x-vector systems are involved in our experiments. Both GMM i-vector and x-vector systems have two parts: a front-end for utterance-level speaker embedding extraction and a back-end for speaker similarity scoring.
In our experiments, we adopt the probabilistic linear discriminant analysis (PLDA) back-end for both kinds of systems.
Gaussian Mixture Model i-vector extraction
The illustration of GMM i-vector extractor [16] is shown in Fig. 1 . It consists of a Gaussian Mixture Model-universal background model (GMM-UBM) and a total variability matrix (T matrix). Given the acoustic features of utterance i, GMM-UBM is used to extract zero (N i ) and first (f i ) order statistics by Baum-Welch statistics computation. The statistics information is incorporated with T matrix to extract ivector ω i as Eq. 1,
where
is the covariance matrix of GMM-UBM.
x-vector extraction
The x-vector extractor [21] leverages DNNs to produce speaker-discriminative embeddings. It consists of frameand utterance-level extractors. At the frame level, acoustic features are fed forward by several layers of time delay neural network (TDNN). At the utterance level, statistics pooling layer aggregates all the frame-level outputs from the last frame-level layer and computes their mean and standard deviation. The mean and standard deviation are concatenated together and propagated through utterance-level layers and finally softmax output layer. In the testing stage, given acoustic features of an utterance, the embedding layer output is extracted as the x-vector.
Probabilistic linear discriminant analysis back-end
PLDA is a supervised version of factor analysis [25] . It models i-vectors/x-vectors (ω) by Eq. 2, In the testing stage, score S is estimated as a log likelihood ratio of two conditional probabilities (Eq. 3). ω 1 and ω 2 are i-vectors/x-vectors extracted from enrollment and test utterances, respectively. H s is the hypothesis that two utterances belong to the same identity, whereas H d is the opposite.
ADVERSARIAL SAMPLES GENERATION
In a general case, we denote a system function as f with parameters θ. Given the input x, we search for an adversarial perturbation δ x to be added to x for maximizing the loss function L between the system's prediction and ground truth y, as shown in Eq. 4,
Note that the system parameters θ are fixed and we revise the input x to maximize the the deviation between the system prediction and the ground truth, to make the system give a wrong prediction. The constraint that the p-norm of δ x is within a perturbation degree guarantees human can not distinguish the adversarial sample x = x + δ x from original x.
Fast gradient sign method
In this work, fast gradient sign method (FGSM) is adopted to solve Eq. 5, in which the norm p is specialized as ∞. The solution is given in Eq. 5,
where function sign(·) takes the sign of the gradient. FGSM perturbs x with a small perturbation multiplied by the sign of the gradient to generate adversarial samples (x ).
Problem formulation & evaluation matrics
In this work, we generate adversarial samples from GMM ivector systems. We denote the whole system by two parts: i-vector extraction function f with parameter θ 1 and PLDA scoring function S with parameter θ 2 . The acoustic feature sequence of each utterance is denoted by X. Normalization steps, such as i-vector normalization, are implicitly included within the functions.
In the testing stage, each trial consists of one enrollment utterance X (e) and one test utterance X. To mimic a realistic model attack, we fix X (e) and system parameters {θ 1 , θ 2 }, and revise X of all trials to perform adversarial attacks. For GMM i-vector framework, there is no explicit ground truth y and loss function L for each output score. We optimize the output score S according to target/non-target trials. For target trials, i.e. the enrollment and test utterances belong to one person, we minimize the similarity score. While for nontarget trials, we maximize the score. The problem formulation and its solution are shown in Eq. 6, 7 and 8.
In this work, we measure the vulnerability of the systems to adversarial attacks by the degradation of the systems' equal error rate (EER) and false acceptance rate (FAR). EER is the rate where acceptance and rejection errors are equal. It reflects the balanced system error rate in terms of acceptance and rejection. The FAR threshold is fixed as the EER threshold in the system without attack. FAR reflects the prediction error rate over non-target trials.
EXPERIMENT SETUP
The dataset used in this experiment is Voxceleb1 [26] , which consists of short clips of human speech. There are totally 148,642 utterances for 1251 speakers. Consistent with [26] , 4874 utterances for 40 speakers are reserved for testing, to generate trials and perform adversarial attacks. The remaining utterances are used for training our SV models. In addition, we apply data augmentation [21] when training x-vector embedding networks.
Mel-frequency cepstral coefficients (MFCCs) and log power magnitude spectrums (LPMSs) are adopted as acoustic features in this experiment. To extract MFCCs, a preemphasis with coefficient of 0.97 is adopted. "Hamming" window having size of 25ms and step-size of 10ms is applied to extract a frame, and finally 24 cepstral coefficients are kept. For LPMSs, "blackman" window having size of 8ms and step-size of 4ms is adopted. No pre-emphasis is applied.
ASV model configuration
In the GMM i-vector system setup, only voice activity detection (VAD) is applied for preprocessing acoustic features. 2048-mixture UBM with full covariance matrix cooperates T matirx with a 400-dimension i-vector space. The i-vectors are centered and length-normalized before PLDA modeling.
In the x-vector system, cepstral mean and variance normalization (CMVN) and VAD are adopted to preprocess the acoustic features. The setup of x-vector embedding network is commonly consistent with [21] . And the extracted x-vectors are centered and projected using a 200-dimension LDA, and then length-normalized before PLDA modeling.
Adversarial attack configuration
In this work, we train three ASV models: MFCC based GMM i-vector system (MFCC-ivec), LPMS based GMM ivector system (LPMS-ivec) and MFCC based x-vector system (MFCC-xvec), and perform white and black box attacks. Two white box attacks are performed on MFCC-ivec and LPMSivec systems respectively, and three black box attacks in the mutual attack settings: LPMS-ivec attacks MFCC-ivec (cross feature), MFCC-ivec attacks MFCC-xvec (cross model architecture) and LPMS-ivec attacks MFCC-xvec (cross both). The last two settings is to investigate the adversarial samples' transferability to x-vector systems.
ABX test
To evaluate the auditory indistinguishability of adversarial audios compared with the original audios, we perform the ABX test [27] , which is a forced choice test to identify detectable differences between two choices of sensory stimuli. The adversarial samples are generated from the LPMS-ivec by using FGSM with equal to 1. Each adversarial audio is reconstructed from the perturbed LPMSs and the phase of its corresponding original audio. In this work, 50 randomly selected original-adversarial audio (A and B) pairs are presented to listeners, and from each pair one audio is chosen as the audio X. Eight listeners join this test, and they are asked to choose one audio from A and B, which is the audio X.
EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS

ABX test results
Experimental results show that the average accuracy of ABX test is 51.5%, which verifies that human cannot distinguish between the adversarial and corresponding original audios.
White box attack
We perform white box attack on two GMM i-vector systems, i.e. MFCCs and LPMSs based systems. The EERs of the systems under different perturbation degree are shown in Table 2 . Especially, the columns where equals 0 exhibit the performance of the systems without attack. We observe that both systems are most vulnerable when equals 1, where the EERs are both increased by around 90%. Meanwhile, the FARs of the systems are also shown in Table 3 . The FARs of both systems are increased by around 90% when equals 1. These two observations confirm that GMM i-vector systems are vulnerable to white box attack. Another observation is that the attack success rate increases first and then decreases as increases, rather than keeps increasing with . The increase at first (small perturbation) is due to the adversarial perturbation effort, but a large perturbation will bring much difference and mitigate this effort to make the attack success rate down. Technically speaking, the function S (in Eq. 6) w.r.t. the input X is actually non-convex, and a large perturbation breaks the linear approximation of S at point X assumed by FGSM. This will decrease the attack effectiveness.
Black box attack
As configured in Section 4.2, three black box attack settings are involved, i.e. LPMS-ivec attacks MFCC-ivec (cross feature), MFCC-ivec attacks MFCC-xvec (cross model architecture) and LPMS-ivec attacks MFCC-xvec (cross both). EERs and FARs are shown in Table 1 and Fig. 2 respectively. We observe that EER is increased by 67.42%, 67.70% and 41.86% in the settings of cross feature, cross model architecture and cross both, respectively. Also, FAR is increased by around 60%, 50% and 30% in cross feature, model architecture and both respectively. These observations confirm that both GMM i-vector and x-vector systems are vulnerable to black box attack. And the systems are most fragile to crossfeature attack, while relatively more robust to cross-both attack. We also observe that the where the target system is most vulnerable is different due to different source-target attack settings. In some cases, increases to a large value to make the most serious attack, e.g. 20 in the cross-feature setting. In this case, the spoofing audio has a noise that human can easily perceive, but human can still confirm the spoofing and original one belong to the same person. Here 2 are some adversarial samples and the corresponding system responses. Since x-vector systems prove to be vulnerable to black box attack, it suggests that these systems are also vulnerable to a more aggressive attack, i.e. white box attack.
CONCLUSION
In this work, we investigate the vulnerability of GMM ivector systems to adversarial attacks and the adversarial transferability to x-vector systems. Experimental results show that GMM i-vector systems are vulnerable to both white and black box attacks. The generated adversarial samples are also proved to be transferable to NN speaker embedding based systems, e.g. x-vector systems. Further work will focus on protecting SV systems against such adversarial attacks.
